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I. Introduction 
A variety of legal instruments, belonging to different legal systems, contribute to the 
legal protection of foreign investment. Amongst them, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
have played and continue to play a prominent role with regard to both the creation of a 
stable and predictable normative framework and the settlement of related disputes.
1
 
This chapter is intended to offer an overview of the main – and in many respects unique – 
features of BITs. It first describes the disadvantages, advantages and potential of the 
largely bilateral framework for the protection of foreign investment (Part II). It then 
examines the special position foreign investors enjoy under these treaties, both in 
substantive and procedural terms, keeping in mind that foreign investors are manifestly 
the main beneficiaries of these treaties, yet formally extraneous to the process leading to 
their conclusion, modification and termination (Part III). Part IV considers how BITs 
strike a balance between the sovereign prerogatives of States parties and the need to 
protect the legitimate expectations that these treaties create for foreign investors. Parts V 
further elaborates on this balancing exercise from the standpoint of the law of treaties. 
Part VI and VII are consecrated, respectively, to some issues of interpretation of BITs 
and the settlement of disputes arising from these treaties. Part VIII touches upon the 
interaction between BITs and State contracts, including the so-called umbrella clauses. A 
full discussion of the relationship between BITs and contracts can be found in Chapter 
VII of this book.
2
   
                                               
1 On foreign investment treaties, see in particular: R. Dolzer, M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1995), G. Sacerdoti, „Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment 
Protection‟, Recueil des Cours 269 (1997) 251; K.J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties. History, 
Policy, and Interpretation (Oxford: OUP, 2010); J.W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford: 
OUP, 2010); G. Van Harten, „Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion‟, Trade 
Law & Development 2 (2010) 1.  
2 On the sources of foreign investment law, see, in particular: P. Juillard, „L‟évolution des sources du 
droit des investissements‟, Recueil des Cours 250 (1994) 9, M. Hirsh, „Sources of International Investment 
Treaties‟, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Research Paper 05-11, July 2011, available at 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=1892564. 
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II. A largely bilateral framework 
There exists no multilateral treaty on foreign investment comparable in terms of 
participation to multilateral trade agreements. Attempts to conclude such a treaty have 
failed and there is no evidence that any such treaty will be concluded in the near future. 
The unsuccessful negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment within the 
OECD 
3
 and the clumsy remake within the WTO 
4
 have demonstrated that disagreement 
on key issues remains an insurmountable obstacle for any meaningful multilateral 
agreement. 
As a matter of treaty law, therefore, foreign investments are currently protected by a 
complex web of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), specific provisions, chapters, or 
legal documents contained in or attached to a large number of bilateral or plurilateral 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs),
5
 as well as the Energy Charter Treaty, a multilateral 
agreement in the energy sector.
 6
 
Regional economic integration may be a vehicle to multilateralize the legal protection of 
foreign investment. It can even offer a third way, alternative to a multilateral treaty on 
investment and a network of BITs.
7
  Such an alternative may also strike a balance of the 
respective advantages of multilateralism and bilateralism. All these issues are discussed 
                                               
3 OSCE, Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft Consolidated Text and Commentary, 22 April 
1998, respectively DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REVI and DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REVI. See also: UNCTAD, Lessons 
from the MAI, New York and Geneva, 1999, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/MISC. 22; P.T. Muchlinski, „The Rise and 
Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?‟, International Lawyer 34 (2000): 1033. 
4 See Decision of the WTO General Council, 1 August 2004, WT/L/579, 2 August 2004.  
5 See, in particular, North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, Chapter XI), European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA, Chapter IX), Central America Free Trade Area - Dominican Republic – (CAFTA-DR, 
Chapter X), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, Chapter XXVI), Association of 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Southern Common Market (Mercosur). 
6 On the Energy Charter Treaty, see, in particular: T.W. Wälde, The Energy Charter Treaty. An East-
West Gateway for Investment Trade (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996); T.W. Wälde, „Energy Charter Treaty-
based Investment Arbitration‟, JWI&T 5 (2004) 373; C. Ribeiro (ed.), Investment Arbitration and the 
Energy Charter Treaty, (Huntington: Juris Publishing, 2006); G. Coop, C. Ribeiro (eds.), Investment 
Protection and The Energy Charter Treaty (Huntington: Juris Publishing, 2008). 
7 On the role the European Union plays after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, see, in particular: 
M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel, S. Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law‟, European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law (2011) Special Issue; A. Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment 
Law (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming). 
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in Chapter II of this book alongside with the question of the alleged incompatibility of 
BITs with the MFN clause embodied in Article II:1 GATS.
8
  
On the latter question, suffice here to mention that the concern expressed in literature on 
the possible violations of MFN obligation under GATS may be countered by arguing that 
the conclusion by virtually all States of a large number of BITs, coupled with the 
acquiescence by those States not involved in such practice, may amount to subsequent 
practice for the purpose of interpreting or even modifying Article II:1 GATS.
9
 
For the time being, however, the legal protection of foreign investment remains to a large 
extent bilateral in character with a wealthy of about 2,800 BITs concluded since 1959 
with a significant acceleration in the last two decades.
10
 Although the figure is certainly 
impressive, its quantitative importance should not be exaggerated for two reasons. On the 
one hand, these treaties cover roughly 14% of the bilateral relationship between states.
11
 
On the other hand, it must be noted that the Energy Charter Treaty alone accounts for the 
equivalent of more than 1,000 bilateral agreements.  
                                               
8 See, in particular, F. Ortino, „The Principle of Non-discrimination and its Exceptions in GATS: 
Selected legal Issues‟, in M. Andenas, K. Alexander (eds.) The World Trade Organization and Trade in 
Services (Leiden: Nijhof, 2008): 173.   
9 From this perspective, the conclusion of a large number of BITS may be treated as “a discernable 
pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, WT/DS11/AB/R [1996] 1 DSR 106; Chile–Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, para 214; EC–Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment,WT/DS62/AB/R, para 90; US–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, para 190. See also the views expressed by the 
International Law Commission, Yearbook ILC 18 (1966-II) 222. On acquiescence, see EC–Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, para 272. On the modification of 
treaties through subsequent practice, see, in particular, Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration, U.S. 
v. France, 22 December 1963, in International Law Reports 38 (1969) 182, p. 249; Case Concerning the 
Temple of Preah Vihear, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 6.        
10 According to UNCTAD, at the end of 2010, States had concluded 2,807 BITs, World Investment 
Report 2011 (UNCTAD/WIR/2011), p. 100, at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-
Full-en.pdf.  For a detailed treatment of the historical evolution of BITs, see K.J. Vandevelde, above n. 1, 
Chapter 2. 
11 To cover the totality of bilateral relationships between n States it is necessary to conclude a number of 
bilateral treaties equivalent to: n (n - 1) / 2, see E. Giraud, „Modification et terminaison des traités 
collectifs‟, Annuaire Institut de droit international 49 (1961) 1, p. 16 ff. 
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Undoubtedly a multilateral treaty has many advantages. First and foremost, it establishes 
a single legal framework and ensures the greatest simplicity, coherence and uniformity 
with regard to the rules applicable to the parties. A multilateral treaty, however, does not 
need to be unduly rigid and contracting parties may accommodate their specific needs 
through variable geometry, protocols, reservations, opting out mechanisms, optional 
declarations or in any other manner permitted under the law of treaties. While introducing 
in the system the necessary degree of flexibility, these devises should not be used 
excessively – or abused – lest of undermining the integrity of the treaty. 
Additionally, multilateral treaties are expected to generate coherent State practice. This is 
facilitated by the existence of a single set of rules applicable by the entities responsible to 
implement the treaty within the jurisdictions of all parties to the treaties. State practice 
can thus consolidate a stable and predictable legal framework, clarify the meaning of the 
rules contained in the treaty, and possibly contribute to the crystallization or development 
of customary international law.  
From the standpoint of the settlement of disputes, furthermore, the interpretation and 
application by national courts and investment arbitral tribunals of the same treaty will in 
all probability reduce the legal uncertainty surrounding investment-related disputes and 
progressively develop a consistent body of jurisprudence tribunals could comfortably rely 
upon. The risk of conflicting decisions, being inherent in the sovereign character of 
international investment tribunals, however, cannot be eliminated simply by adopting a 
multilateral treaty.   
While recognizing all these advantages of multilateral treaties, nevertheless, one should 
not be unconditionally hostile to BITs as bilateralism is not necessarily less effective or 
less adequate that multilateralism and in turn offers its own advantages.   
In the first place, there is no compelling economic evidence than a multilateral treaty 
would have a significantly bigger positive impact on the flow of foreign investment than 
a network of BITs. It must be noted in this respect that recent empirical studies point to a 
stimulating effect of BITs on the flow of investment towards the concerned States.
12
 
                                               
12 See, for instance: E. Neumayer, L. Spess, „Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries?‟, World Development (2005): 1567; K. Gallagher, M.B.L. Birch, „Do 
Investment Agreement attract Investment?‟, Journal of World Investment & Trade 7 (2006): 961; P. Egger, 
V. Merlo, „The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on FDI Dynamics‟, World Economics 30 (2007): 
1536; J.B. Yackee, „Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties‟, 
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Apart from the difficulties in determining the link between the conclusion of BITs and 
the increase in foreign investment, however, it must not be neglected that countries bound 
by a handle of BITs or no BITs at all - such as Japan or Brazil - have managed to attract 
remarkable flows of foreign investment.  
Second, the current legal framework, however fragmented, works quite well. It is in 
continuous expansion, even though the conclusion of new BITs has slowed down in the 
last few years. Additionally, the accuracy, level of sophistication and coherence of the 
current legal framework progressively improves due the renegotiation of BITs, the 
elaboration of new model BITs, and the development of a largely consistent body of 
arbitral decisions.  
Third, the framework has a significant potential for improvement with regard to both 
substantive and procedural rules (for instance, through the inclusion, respectively, of 
provisions on the protection of human rights and the environment, and of clauses on 
consolidation 
13
 and judicial review 
14
). 
Forth, the most-favored-nation treatment clause (MFN) contained in the overwhelming 
majority of modern BITs upgrades the legal protection enjoyed by foreign investors, 
although the clause works in quite a different manner compared with MFN clauses 
contained in international trade agreements. 
15
 Described as a “potent ratchet”, 16 this 
                                                                                                                                            
Brooklyn Journal International Law 33 (2008): 405; J. Tobin, S. Rose-Ackerman, „When BITs have some 
Bite‟, in R.A. Alford, C. Rogers (eds.), The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2009): 131.  
13 See, for instance: Article 1126 NAFTA;  Article 33, 2004 United States BIT Model; Article 32, 2004 
Canada BIT Model, at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf; Article 37 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, 26 February 2009, at http://www.aseansec.org/22218.htm; 
Article 10.24, FTA United States – Mexico, 15-Jun-2004, at 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/CRShowRTAIDCard.aspx?enc=Q6mlxSufgPIwin1qUYY1HY5jXkJ6LqSsfoOPqS+
O+Jk=; Article 10.26 FTA Canada – Chile; Article 101, FTA Chile – Japan, 27-Mar-2007 at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf. For a case of consolidation, see Pan 
American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/13, Decision 
on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006. 
14 See, for instance, Annex D (Possibility of a Bilateral Appellate Mechanism), 2004 United States BIT 
Model;  Annex 10 D ((Possibility of a Bilateral Appellate Mechanism), FTA United States – Morocco.  
15 See also Article 1103 NAFTA and Article 40 (2) of the EFTA/Singapore Agreement. See also 
UNCTAD, „Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment‟, New York – Geneva, 1999, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (Vol. 
III), at http://www.unctad.og/en/docs/psiteiitd10v3.en.pdf; OECD, „Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in 
International Investment Law‟, Working Papers on International Investment, November 2004/2, at 
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contingent standard enables foreign investors to invoke the better treatment accorded by the 
host State to investors of any third State,
17
 provided that there is correspondence as to the 
subject matter between the two treaties (ejusdem generis principle). 
18
  
Finally, for decades BIT were concluded between developed countries and developing 
countries, as foreign investment essentially flowed from the former to the latter. 
Nowadays, investing abroad is not any more a privilege of developed countries and BITs 
have a truly universal dimension as a large number of them are concluded between 
emerging or developing countries. Since the content of BITs is to a large extent similar or 
identical, at least with regard to the main substantive rules, these treaties have 
significantly influenced the customary rules in this field.
19
 This process has contributed to 
increase the coherence and uniformity of international investment law.
20
 
Last but not least, three main specific advantages of bilateralism deserve to be mentioned. 
First, the flexibility of a bilateral framework permits States to tailor their commitments in 
accordance with their specific needs.
21
 Indeed, BITs contain a variety of provisions, 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085.pdf. In literature, see: S. Fietta, „Most Favoured Nation 
Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?‟, IALR 4 (2005) 
131; P. Acconci, „Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and International Law on Foreign Investment‟, in P. 
Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 363; A. Ziegler, “Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment‟, in A. Reinisch 
(ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 59; S.W. Schill, The 
Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), Chapter IV. 
16 C. McLachlan, L. Shore, M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2007), p. 
254. 
17 As pointed out in Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/8, Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, para 120, the 
clause “relates only to more favourable treatment”. 
18 The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award, 6 
March 1956, XII UNRIAA (1963), p. 83, at p. 107. See also Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID ARB/97/7, Award 
on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, para 48 ff. 
19 See, for instance, Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, ICSID ARB(AF)/99/2 (NAFTA), 
Award, 11 October 2002, para. 43. 
20 For a thoroughly discussion, see S.W. Schill, above n. 15. See also S.M. Schwebel, „The Influence of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law‟, American Society International Law 
Proceedings 98 (2004) 27; J.H. Alvarez, „A BIT on Custom‟, N. Y. Univ. J. Int’l L. & Pol.  42 (2010) 17. 
21 As noted by K.C. Kennedy, „A WTO Agreement on Investments: A Solution in Search of a Problem‟, 
Univ. Pennsylvania J. Int’l Econ. L. 24 (2003) 77, p. 183, “Bilateral investment agreements offer the 
flexibility that is not possible under a multilateral framework. BITs can be tailored to fit country-specific 
needs in a way that is not possible under a multilateral framework”.  
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especially with regard to the definition of investment, the nationality of the investor, pre-
establishment treatment, emergency clauses, and, perhaps more prominently, the 
settlement of disputes. 
More than that, it is not uncommon that the provisions of the very same BIT do not apply 
in a symmetric way to both parties. This may occur with regard to substantive provisions, 
or, more frequently, the provisions on the settlement of disputes. According to Article II 
(1) of the BIT between United States and Argentina, for instance, each party is entitled to 
maintain or make exceptions to the national treatment obligation in the sectors indicated 
by each of them in the protocol. An example of asymmetric provisions related to the 
settlement of disputes can be found in Article 10 (2) of the BIT concluded between The 
Netherlands and China, according to which China may require Dutch investors to exhaust 
the domestic administrative review procedure before submitting the dispute to an 
international investment tribunal.
22
   
Second, the bilateral nature of these treaties facilitates their modification through 
protocols, amendments or subsequent practice. Contracting parties may thus alter their 
obligations in order to meet their evolving financial or economic needs or to keep the 
rules governing foreign investment in line with the evolution of international law, 
especially in relation to the protection of the environment, labour standards and human 
rights. 
From this perspective, BITs were traditionally silent on the protection of the environment 
or contained only broad references to it in preambles. In the last few years, however, 
contracting parties to BITs have included with increasing frequency provisions on the 
protection of the environment. 
23
 These provisions are rather heterogeneous as far as their 
content is concerned and often drafted in general terms. Moreover, even when they 
impose sufficiently clear substantive obligations they normally do not fall within the 
scope of the arbitral clauses. 
24
 Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that the bilateral 
                                               
22 See also Ad Article 11 (2) of the Protocol to the BIT concluded between China and Switzerland; 
Article 8 (2) of the BIT between China and Argentina. 
23 For a couple of example, see Article VII (4) BIT between Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union and 
Colombia, Article 2 (3) BIT between the Russian Federation and Hungary; Article 7 (2) BIT between 
Canada and Peru. For a recent survey, see K. Gordon, J. Pohl, Environmental Concerns in Investment 
Agreements: A Survey, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2011/1, May 2011, at 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/environmental-concerns-in-international-investment-
agreements_5kg9mq7scrjh-en. 
24
 See, for instance, Articles 12 (1), 24 (1) and 37 of the United States model BIT. 
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character of the framework allows for an incremental process which may be expected to 
lead in due time to the inclusion of these provisions on a large scale. Such a result may be 
difficult if not impossible to be achieved in the context of a multilateral treaty.     
It is also worthwhile noting that some Free Trade Agreements (FTA) or agreements 
concluded between FTA and third States contain a so-called evolutionary clause whereby 
the parties undertook to review the legal protection of foreign investment, often through a 
Joint Committee, in order to bring it in line with further developments in international 
economic relations 
25
 or improve the internal legal framework regarding investments. 
26
  
Third, the adoption of binding common interpretations, should the need arise to clarify 
the content of certain treaty provisions, is obviously much easier in the context of 
bilateral treaties than multilateral treaties. Certain BITs contain specific provisions for 
that purpose. 
27
 Argentina and Panama, for instance, exchanged diplomatic notes with an 
“interpretative declaration” of the MFN clause contained in the BIT they had concluded 
in 1996.
28
 
III. Nature of BITs 
BITs squarely fall within the definition of treaty under Article 2 (1) (a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as they are international agreements 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law. They 
normally pursue two main objectives. On the one hand, they aim at stimulating the flow 
of foreign investment and creating a stable and predictable legal environment for their 
management; on the other hand, they promote the economic development of the host 
State and the economic relations between the parties.
29
 The two objectives are intimately 
related and mutually supportive.  
                                               
25 See, for instance, the agreement between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Croatia, 
at http://www.efta.int/content/legal-texts/third-country-relations/croatia/HR-FTA.pdf. 
26 See, for instance, Article 33 of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), at 
http://www.cefta2006.com/doc/CETA-Linkovi/Home/eng/CEFTA%202006%20ANNEX%201.pdf.   
27 See, for instance, Article 17.2 BIT between the United Kingdom and Mexico. See also Article 30 (3) 
of the United States 2004 Model BIT. 
28 As referred to by the Tribunal in National Grid plc v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 20 June 2006, para 85.  
29 See, for instance, Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 
2006, para 300. 
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As a matter of fact, however, virtually all substantive rules contained in these treaties are 
meant to protect foreign investors who, although not formally party of the treaty, are 
clearly their main beneficiaries.
30
 It is illustrative that certain BITs,
31
 alongside with the 
Energy Charter Treaty,
32
 in case of disputes between foreign investors and the host State 
provide access to international arbitral tribunals exclusively to the former. 
It must also be noted that obligations imposed upon foreign investors by BITs, such as 
the obligation to act in good faith 
33
 or the obligations to comply with local laws and 
regulations, 
34
 are functional to the enjoyment by foreign investors themselves of the 
legal protection provided for by the treaties.   
The manifestly asymmetrical nature of these treaties, with all obligations incumbent upon 
the host State and virtually all rights granted to the foreign investors, has often been 
criticized, especially from the human rights standpoint.
35
 Such a feature is certainly not 
inherent in this kind of treaties, but rather a deliberate choice of the contracting parties. 
Nothing would prevent contracting parties from inserting in these treaties provisions 
imposing upon foreign investors or upon both foreign investors and the host state 
substantive obligations, including those related to the protection of human rights and 
labour or environment standards. The contracting parties could even agree on the 
settlement through arbitration of disputes concerning these obligations between nationals 
                                               
30 See, for instance, American Manufacturing and Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID ARB/93/1, Award, 21 
February 1997, para 6.06. 
31 See, for instance, Article 10 (3) BIT between China and The Netherlands; Article 8 (2) BIT between 
Switzerland and Ethiopia; Article 9 (2) BIT between Italy and Pakistan; Article 6 (2) BIT between Egypt 
and Nigeria.   
32  Article 26 (1) of the Energy Charter Treaty provides for the settlement of disputes between a 
Contracting Party and a foreign investor “for alleged breach of an obligation of the former”. 
33 In Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, para 106, for 
instance, the Tribunal held that “[t]he protection of international investment arbitration cannot be granted if 
such protection would run contrary to the general principles of international law, among which the 
principle of good faith is of utmost importance”. 
34 See, for instance, Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID ARB/03/26, Award, 2 
August 2006, para 249. 
35 See, for instance, J.E. Alvarez, „Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement‟s 
Chapter Eleven‟, Univ. Miami Inter-Am. Law Review 28 (1996-7) 303, p. 308, who describes NAFTA 
investment chapter as “a human rights treaty for a special-interest group” and “a treaty that is effectively 
silent with respect of the rights of others, who may be affected by foreign direct investment flow”. 
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of a party and investors of another party or between those within the jurisdiction of a 
party and investors of another party.
36
 
The asymmetric nature of BITs is further amplified by more favorable provisions clauses 
often contained in BITs according to which the treaty does not derogate from any other 
rules of international law, including other investment treaties, as well as national 
legislation, to the extent the former are more favorable to the investor.
37
 
More than the unbalance of substantive provisions, however, what make these treaties 
truly remarkable is that the investor is allowed to vindicate violations of the obligations 
imposed by these treaties before the national tribunals of the host State and – with rare 
exceptions 
38
 – before international tribunals, normally without the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies being necessary.
39
 The direct access to international tribunals has 
prompted a stimulating debate on the legal nature of the rights enjoyed by investors and 
the latter‟s status in international law.  
The most enthusiastic position has been taken by the Plama Tribunal. It observed that 
Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, which provides for the settlement of disputes 
between foreign investors and the host State, “is a very important feature of the ECT 
which is itself a very significant treaty for investors, marking another step in their 
transition from objects to subjects of international law”.40 
According to a more prudent and convincing approach, foreign investors can be seen as 
participants in international law, thus overcoming the sterile dichotomy between subjects 
                                               
36 T. Weiler, „Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different Legal 
Order‟, Boston College Int. & Comp. Law Review 27 (2004) 429, proposes some draft articles that could be 
inserted in investment treaties in order to recognize and make enforceable the investment-related human 
rights of nationals of the host State. In line with the scope of application of most human rights treaties, it 
may even be argued that these remedies should not be confined to nationals of the host State, but be 
available to those within its jurisdiction of the Host State, regardless to their nationality. At any rate, these 
remedies could be subjected to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
37 For an example, see Article 9 BIT between China and Switzerland. 
38 See below, note 96. 
39 Exhaustion of local remedies is rarely required in BITs. For an example see Article 13 (4) of the BIT 
between Australia and Poland. In literature, see M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment 
Disputes (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000); C. McLachlan, L. Shore, M. Weiniger, above n. 16; Z. Douglas, The 
International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
40 Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, 
para 141 in fine. 
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and objects. The basic assumption behind this approach is that „there is no inherent 
reason why the individual should not be able directly to invoke international law and to 
be the beneficiary of international law‟.41  
Significantly, already in 1928, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that 
it cannot be disputed that the very object of any international agreement, according to the 
intention of the contracting parties, may be the adoption of some definite rules creating 
individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national courts.
42
 
The Court pointed out that the individual rights stemming from the treaty could be 
enforced before national tribunals, although this may require the adoption by the parties 
of the necessary national legal instruments.
43
 The position of the Court nonetheless 
amounted to an important step in respect of the participation of individuals in 
international law. 
That an international treaty can create rights in favour of individuals was reiterated in 
even clearer terms by the International Court of Justice in LaGrand with regard to Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that creates individual rights which 
could be invoked in the ICJ by the national State of the person concerned.44 
In a subsequent case, the International Court of Justice clarified its position by observing 
that the individual rights protected under paragraph Article 36 or the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations must be asserted first before national tribunals. According to the 
                                               
41 R. Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 
p. 54. See also on the notion of individuals as participants in international dispute settlement and 
investment arbitration: E. De Brabandere, „Non-state actors in international dispute settlement: pragmatism 
in international law‟ in J. d'Aspremont (ed.), Participants in the International Legal System. Multiple 
Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011): 342-359; P. 
Dumberry, E. Labelle Eastaugh, „Non-State Actors in International Investment Law: The Legal Personality 
of Corporations and NGOs in the Context of Investor-State Arbitration‟, ibid., 360-371  
42 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 15 (1928) p. 17-18. 
43 The Court also noted that Poland could not invoke the fact that the relevant treaty had not been 
incorporated into the Polish domestic legal system to escape from its international obligations (p. 26-7). On 
the necessity of a national legal instrument giving effect to the treaty within the jurisdiction of the parties, 
see one of the most influential members of the Permanent Court of International Justice, D. Anzilotti, 
Cours de droit international public (Paris: Sirey, 1929), p. 407 ff.  
44 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2001, p. 466, para 77. 
But see the separate opinion by Judge Shi, p. 518. 
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Court, only when local remedies have been exhausted the national State is entitled to 
espouse the individual claims of its nationals through diplomatic protection. 
45
 
Yet, two different and independent legal relationships coexist. The first legal relationship, 
between the host State and the individual, allows the later to bring a claim before the 
tribunals of the former. Once the domestic remedies have been exhausted, the State may 
“espouse” the individual claim and exercise diplomatic protection. 46 The second legal 
relationship, between the host State and the national State, enables the latter to directly 
react on the international plane and possibly file an application before the ICJ, assuming 
the latter can exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute. The same conduct by the host State 
may violate at once the rights of the individual and those of its national State, and 
therefore affect both legal relationships and trigger their respective remedies. 
Against this background, investment treaties amount to a normative breakthrough as they 
normally pave the way to the direct access by foreign investors to international 
investment tribunals. It must be emphasized in this respect that Article 26  of the ICSID 
convention expressly excludes the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties in the relevant international treaty. 
Two alternatives have been suggested to explain the legal position of the investor in 
international investment treaties and its relationship with both the host State and the 
home State: 
(1) the treaty creates a legal relationship between the host State and the investor. The 
latter is then the holder of substantive rights and may resort to the remedies available 
under the treaty;   
                                               
45
 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2004, p. 
12, para 40. 
46 According to the UN International Law Commission (ILC) “[t]he individual is the subject of many 
primary rules of international law, both under custom and treaty, which protect him at home, against his 
own Government, and abroad, against foreign Governments. […] This protection is not limited to personal 
rights. Bilateral investment treaties confer rights and protection on both legal and natural persons in respect 
of their property rights”, Commentary to Article 1 of the Draft Articles, para 4, at  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf. The ILC further pointed 
out that, “[d]raft article 1 is formulated in such a way as to leave open the question whether the State 
exercising diplomatic protection does so in its own right or that of its nationals – or both. It views 
diplomatic protection through the prism of State responsibility and emphasizes that it is a procedure for 
securing the responsibility of the State for injury to the national flowing from an internationally wrongful 
act”. 
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(2) the substantive rules continue to apply exclusively between the Parties, but the related 
procedural rights in case of disputes are granted to and can be exercised directly by the 
concerned foreign investor.
 47
 
Both alternatives elucidate the real nature of BITs and ultimately lead to the same result. 
48
 The first alternative, nonetheless, is to be preferred as it realistically describes 
investment arbitration as “a remedy exercisable by an investor by itself and in its own right 
against the host state”.
49
 In a recent case, a tribunal held that 
in the case of Chapter XI of the NAFTA […] the intention of the Parties was to confer 
substantive rights directly upon investors. That follows from the language used and is 
confirmed by the fact that Chapter XI confers procedural rights upon them. The notion that 
Chapter XI conferred upon investors a right, in their own name and for their own benefit, to 
institute proceedings to enforce rights which were not theirs but were solely the property of 
the State of their nationality is counterintuitive.
 50
 
It must however be pointed out that under neither alternative referred to above the legal 
relationship between the States parties to the treaty is disposed of. In both cases, the 
treaty continues to impose upon the host State primary obligations owed to the other 
State. Under the first alternative described above, these obligations have an identical 
content to those owed to the investor, but remain quite independent from them. As such, 
they may be the object of an international claim in accordance with the relevant rules 
contained in the treaty. Under the second alternative, while the State remains the sole 
holder of the rights stemming from the treaty, alleged non-compliance with the 
corresponding obligations may bring about a dispute between the investor and the host 
State as well as between the States concerned.       
Either way, international investment treaties provide for two different categories of 
disputes between different parties and before different tribunals. The same facts may 
generate two independent disputes – the first between the investor and the host State and 
                                               
47 Z. Douglas, „The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitrations‟, British Year Book 
International Law (2003) 151, especially p. 181-184. 
48
 See also Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3467, Judgment, 9 September 2005, para 18.  
49 Plama v. Bulgaria, above n. 40, para 150. See also Occidental Exploration v. Ecuador, above n. 48, 
paras 14 - 22.   
50 Corn Products International, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/04/1 (NAFTA), Decision on 
Responsibility (redacted version), 15 January 2008, para 169.   
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the second between the States concerned.
 51
 No question of litispendens would arise as 
the parties to the dispute are different. Consequently, the dispute between the foreign 
investor and the host State is not affected by the filing by the latter of a case against the 
home State. In Empresas Lucchetti v. Peru, the Respondent filed a request for suspension 
of the proceedings since the same allegations were the subject of a concurrent State-to-
State arbitration. The Tribunal held that the conditions for a suspension of the 
proceedings were not met and rejected the request without any further discussion. 
52 
The dispute between the foreign investor and the host State is completely dissociated and 
independent from the conduct of the home State. This is confirmed by the fact that home 
States have occasionally taken position against the competence of investment tribunals to 
settle disputes between their own nationals and the host State,
53
 or expressed 
disagreement on the merits with the position of their own nationals.
54
  
IV. States’ regulatory powers and investors’ legitimate expectations 
International investment law is essentially concerned with the legal relationship between 
the host State and foreign investors. On the one hand, once admitted to invest in the 
territory of the host States, investors are subjected to and must comply with local laws 
and regulations. On the other hand, the host State is fully entitled to exercise its 
regulatory powers over foreign investors. The ultimate purpose of BITs is precisely to 
define how the host State must treat foreign investors. From this perspective, a delicate 
balance needs to be struck between the regulatory powers of the host State and the need 
to legally protect the interests of foreign investors.
55
 While a full discussion on this 
balancing exercise, which is at the heart of foreign investment law, falls beyond the scope 
                                               
51 In Plama v. Bulgaria, above n. 40, para 150, the Tribunal held that even if the investor cannot invoke 
Article 26 Energy Charter Treaty (settlement of disputes between investors and host State), it would leave 
intact its home state‟s right to invoke Article 27 Energy Charter Treaty against the host State. 
52 Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Peru, ICSID ARB/03/4, Award, 7 February 
2005, paras 7 and 9.  
53 See, for instance, United States Submission in GAMI Investment Inc. v. Mexico, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22212.pdf. 
54 See, for instance, Canada  Second Submission in Mondev v. United States, 6 July 2001, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18271.pdf. 
55 India has argued before the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment that “investment 
protection at present is guaranteed by a host of bilateral investment promotion and protection agreements 
(BIPPAs) that countries have entered into with other countries.  Many governments look upon these 
bilateral instruments as on the one hand giving policy flexibility for themselves while assuring foreign 
investors a degree of comfort and safety for their investments” (WT/WGTI/W/86, 22 June 2000, p. 3).   
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of this chapter, a couple of general considerations from the standpoint of BITs are in 
order.    
By concluding a BIT the contracting parties accept some obligations – in addition to in 
addition to those stemming from customary international law and other applicable 
international treaties – in relation to the exercise of their sovereign rights in their dealings 
with foreign investors. As observed by a tribunal, according to „the basic international 
law principles […] while a sovereign State possesses the inherent right to regulate its 
domestic affairs, the exercise of such right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries. 
… [T]he rule of law, which includes treaty obligations, provides such boundaries‟.56 As 
long as these boundaries are respected, the host State has no duty to compensate foreign 
investors, even when the  measures adopted have a negative economic impact on their 
business.57 The principle is not affected by the fact that several provisions contained in 
BITs still remain fraught with legal uncertainty, as in the case of indirect expropriation.
58
  
Equally important, investment tribunals are not meant to review or assess the exercise of 
regulatory powers by the host State. Quite the contrary, their task is strictly limited to 
determine whether the host State has violated any of the limits imposed by the relevant 
                                               
56 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Hungary, ICSID ARB/03/16, Award, 
2 October 2006, para 423. 
57 As emphasised in Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 
29 May 2003, para 119, „[t]he principle that the State‟s exercise of its sovereign powers within the 
framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers as administrator 
without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable‟. See also S.D. Myers v. Canada, 
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para 285; Methanex Corp. v. United 
States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part IV, para 410; Saluka Investments BV v. 
Czech Republic, above n. 29, para 276. 
58 See, for instance, Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 3 September 2004, para 200; Saluka 
Investments BV v. Czech Republic, above n. 29, para 263. See also: A. Reinisch, „Expropriation‟, Report 
submitted to the ILA, at www.ilahq.org/pdf/Foreign%20Investment/ILA%20paper%20Reinisch.pdf; W.M. 
Reisman, R.D. Sloane, „Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the BIT Generation‟, 74 BYIL (2004) 
115; J. Paulsson, Z. Douglas, „Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitration‟, in N. Horn, S. 
Kröll (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague: Kluwer, 2004), p. 145; L.Y. Fortier, 
S.L. Drymer, „Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or 
Caveat Investor‟, ICSID Review - FILJ 19 (2004) 293; A. Newcombe, „The Boundaries of Regulatory 
Expropriation in International Law‟, ICSID Review - FILJ 20 (2005) 1; S. Montt, State Liability in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration (Oxford: Hart, 2009), Chapter 5; T. Gazzini, Drawing the Line between Non-
compensable Regulatory Powers and Indirect Expropriation of Foreign Investment, 7 Manchester Jour. Int. 
Econ. Law (2010) 36. 
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BIT. The finding of the Tribunal in S.D. Myres v. Canada in relation to Chapter XI 
NAFTA can certainly be extended to BITs. Accordingly, investment tribunals do not 
have   
an open-ended mandate to second-guess government decision-making. Governments have to 
make many potentially controversial choices. In doing so, they may appear to have made 
mistakes, to have misjudged the facts, proceeded on the basis of a misguided economic or 
sociological theory, placed too much emphasis on some social values over others and 
adopted solutions that are ultimately ineffective or counterproductive. The ordinary remedy, 
if there were one, for errors in modern governments is through internal political and legal 
processes, including elections.
59
 
Some BITs further safeguard the regulatory powers of the parties by inserting three types 
of clauses. The first type of clause reaffirms and elaborates on the right of States to 
regulate in certain specific domains, such as the protection of the environment. They vary 
significantly. A good example can be found in Article VII (4) BIT between Belgium-
Luxemburg Economic Union and Colombia, which reads: 
[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed as to prevent a Contracting Party from 
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measures that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
an investment activity in its territory is undertaken in accordance with environmental law of 
the Party.
 60
 
Although these clauses are normally not covered by the provisions on investor-State or 
State-State disputes, they may offer important indication with regard to the balancing of 
public interest against the interests of foreign investors.  
A second type of clause aims at preserving the right of States to adopt measures that are 
normally  inconsistent with their international obligations, but nonetheless necessary to 
protect its fundamental interests.
61
 Article 2 (3) of the BIT between the Russian 
Federation and Hungary, for instance, provides that  
                                               
59 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para 
261. See also Gami Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, 15 November 2004, para 
93. 
60 Emphasis added. See also Article 12 (1) of the United States model BIT, at 
http://italaw.com/documents/USmodelbitnov04.pdf, according to which  the Parties recognize that it is 
inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic 
environmental laws. 
61
 A selection of these clauses can be found in K. Gordon, J. Pohl, above n. 23, p. 17-18.  
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[t]his Agreement shall not preclude the application of either Contracting Party of measures, 
necessary for the maintenance of defence, national security and public order, protection of 
the environment, morality and public health. 
A third type of clause is a typical conflict clause. Article 7 (2) of the BIT between Canada 
and Peru, for instance, allows for the adoption of certain measures intended to protect the 
environment that otherwise would be contrary to treaty obligation, provided that they are 
non discriminatory. It reads: 
[a] measure that requires an investment to use a technology to meet generally applicable 
health, safety or environmental requirements shall not be construed to be inconsistent with 
paragraph 1(f) [to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge]. 
For greater certainty, Articles 3 [national treatment] and 4 [most-favoured-nation treatment] 
apply to the measure.  
All these clauses may be considered by investment tribunal for the purpose of assessing 
the legitimate expectations of foreign investors. Yet, several investment tribunals have 
emphasized that in exercising its regulatory powers, the host State must respect the 
expectations that foreign investors may have legitimately built on the basis of  promises, 
undertakings, declarations and representations made explicitly or implicitly by local 
authorities in relation to the establishment and management of the investment.         
The notion of legitimate expectations affects virtually all instances in which foreign 
investors enter into contact with and are subject to the exercise of public authorities 
within the jurisdiction of the host State. In Tecmed v Mexico, for instance, the Tribunal 
considered the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard and held that 
[Article 4(1) BIT between Spain and Mexico], in light of the good faith principle established 
by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments 
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in 
a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the 
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will 
govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. 
62
 
                                               
62 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, 
para 154. See also: Wälde, Separate Opinion in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, 
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, 26 January 2006, esp. paras 27 ff.; Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil 
Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, ICSID ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, para 609. In 
literature, see, in particular R. Dolzer, „New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property‟, 
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The finding, which has been quoted with approval by several tribunals 
63
, emphasises the 
need to protect the legitimate expectation of private investors in their dealing with the 
host State. Intimately related to the principle of good faith, 
64
 the principle of legitimate 
expectations has been borrowed from domestic administrative law. It has emerged within 
the different domestic legal systems for the purpose of protecting natural and legal person 
subjected to the authority of public bodies.
 65
 
 
V. States domini of the treaties 
While foreign investors are the main beneficiaries of BITs, State parties remain “the 
transaction‟s exclusive and absolute domini”.66 At any time they can agree on a given 
interpretation of, formally or informally modify, or even terminate the treaty, in 
accordance with the treaty itself or, when the treaty is silent on the specific issue, with the 
law on treaties. This means that foreign investors are exposed to the risk of a change in 
the legal protection they enjoy under the BIT in the host State due to the joint or 
                                                                                                                                            
American Jour. Int. Law 75 (1981) 553; E. Snodgrass, „Protecting Investors‟ Legitimate Expectations: 
Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle‟, ICSID Review – FILJ 21 (2006); S. Fietta, „The 
„Legitimate Expectations‟ Principle under Article 1105 NAFTA. International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v. Mexico‟, JWI&T 7 (2006) 423; I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in 
International Foreign Investment Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), especially p. 163-168; K.J. Vandevelde, „A 
Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment‟, New York Univ. Jour. Int. Law and Politics 43 (2010) 43. 
63 See, for instance, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID ARB/01/7, Award, 25 
May 2004, paras 114-115; Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion, 19 August 2005, 
para 235. As observed in Saluka v. Czech Republic, above n. 29, para 302, the standard of “fair and 
equitable treatment” is therefore closely tied to the notion of legitimate expectations which is the dominant 
element of that standard‟. 
64 Already in 1983, the Tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia, Award on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, p. 
359, p. 385, held that „any convention […] should be construed in good faith, that is to say by taking into 
account the consequence of their commitments the parties may be considered as having reasonably and 
legitimately envisaged‟. 
65 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p. 
358. See also B. Kingsbury, S. Schill, „Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law‟, September 2009, at ssrn.com. 
66 The expression has been borrowed from G. Arangio-Ruiz, The United Nations Declaration on 
Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of International Law (Alpheen a/d Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1979), p. 284-285, esp. note 183. 
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unilateral action of the parties to the treaty. It is worth pointing out that they may lose the 
protection of a BIT due to the decision of their own national states to terminate it. 
From the standpoint of the law of the treaties, the fact that the foreign investor is 
extraneous to the rule-making process leading to the conclusion, amendment and 
termination of the treaty calls for some important considerations. 
In the first place, the parties to a BIT can at any time amend its content, either formally 
(i.e. through a protocol) or informally (through subsequent practice). For the purpose of 
interpreting and applying a provision in the settlement of a given dispute, nonetheless, the 
amendment cannot produce its effects retroactively, if the rights acquired under the treaty 
by the foreign investor are to be adequately protected within a stable and predictable legal 
framework. This makes it indispensable to determine whether the amendment has taken 
place at the time of the conduct allegedly inconsistent with the BIT. 
As pointed out by the Enron and Sempra tribunals with regard to the alleged self-judging 
character of Article XI of the BIT between Argentina and the United States, 
[e]ven if [the self-judging] interpretation were shared today by both parties to the Treaty, it 
would still not result in a change of its terms. States are of course free to amend the Treaty 
by consenting to another text, but this would not affect rights acquired under the Treaty by 
investors or other beneficiaries. 67 
It cannot be denied, however, that in practice it may be rather difficult to distinguish 
amendments, which alter the rights and obligations of the parties to the treaties, from 
interpretations, which on the contrary confirms or defines their content. This has been 
demonstrated by the controversial interpretation of Article 1105 NAFTA given in 2001 
by the Free Trade Commission. 
68
  
                                               
67 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/3,  Award, 22 May 
2007, para 337; Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 2007, 
para 385. The statement would have been clearer had it specified in the first sentence that no change would 
have resulted “for the purpose of this dispute”. As observed by B.C. Clagett, „Expropriation Issue before 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Is Just Compensation Required by International Law or Not‟, Law 
& Pol'y Int'l Bus. 16 (1984): 813, p. 823, “[c]ustomary international law has long regarded such elementary 
principle as respect for lawfully acquired rights and respect for lawfully concluded agreements (pacta sunt 
servanda) as the cornerstones of relations between States and alien investors”. 
68 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 
2001, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA_Comm_1105_Transparency.pdf. For a sharp critique of 
the Commission interpretation, see Second Opinion of Professor R. Jennings, in Methanex Corporation v 
United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_methanex.htm. As 
pointed out by I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Manchester: MUP, 
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Additionally, States may also react to what they perceive as an inaccurate interpretation 
or application of BITs and clarify their intention by adopting unilateral statements or 
agreeing on joint legal instruments. In Société Générale v. Pakistan, for instance, 
Switzerland submitted a declaration expressing concern over the narrow interpretation 
given by the arbitral tribunal to the meaning of the so-called umbrella contained in the 
relevant BIT. 
69
 Similarly, several States, concerned about the uncertainty which 
characterises the interpretation of MFN treatment clauses and arguably in reaction to the 
Maffezini v. Spain decision on jurisdiction,
70
 have availed themselves of different 
techniques to dissipate any possible doubt concerning their common intention. 
71
 
Finally, since investments are normally long-term operations, it is necessary to ensure 
that the protection guaranteed under BITs is sufficiently stable, while preserving the right 
of States to denounce these treaties. This is obtained through peculiar clauses contained 
in virtually all BITs that allow both parties to terminate the treaty, either at the end of the 
initial or any subsequent period of validity, or any time in the case of unlimited duration 
                                                                                                                                            
1984), p. 138, “[i]t is inevitably difficult, if not impossible, to fix the dividing line between interpretation 
properly so called and modification effected under the pretext of interpretation”. See also: J-P. Cot, „La 
conduite subséquente des parties à un traité‟, Revue générale droit international public 70 (1966) 633; 
M.K. Yasseen, „L‟interprétation des traités d‟après la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités‟, 
Recueil des cours 151 (1976-III) 1, Chapter IV; F. Capotorti, „Sul valore della prassi applicativa dei trattati 
secondo la Convenzione di Vienna‟, in Il diritto internazionale al tempo della sua codificazione, Studi Ago 
(Milano: Giuffrè, 1987), vol. I, p. 197; H. Thirlway, „The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice. 1960-1989 (Part Three)‟, British Year Book International Law 62 (1991) 1, p. 48 ff. 
69 Note on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty Between Switzerland and 
Pakistan, attached to the Letter of the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs to the ICSID Deputy-
Secretary General, 1 October 2003, in  Mealey’s International Arbitration Reports, February 2004. 
70 Maffezini v. Spain, above n. 18. 
71 Ad art. 4, al. (2) of the Protocol of the BIT recently concluded between Switzerland and Colombia, 
for instance, reads in part: „[f]or greater certainty, it is further understood that the MFN treatment […] does 
not encompass mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes provided for in other international 
agreements concluded by the Party concerned”, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2006/8081.pdf. 
See, also Article 5 (2) of the BIT concluded between Switzerland and Serbia Montenegro, 7 December 
2007, at http://admin.ch/ch/f/rs/i9/0.975.268.2.fr.pdf; Annex 804.1 of the FTA between Canada and Peru, 
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Canada-
PeruFTA_chapter8-en.pdf. Article 4 (3) of the 2007 Norway Model BIT, in turn, reads: “For greater clarity, 
treatment referred to in paragraph (1) does not encompass dispute resolution mechanism provided for in 
this agreement or other International Agreements”. 
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or extension. As a rule, the right to terminate the treaty must be exercised in accordance 
with the notice period requirement, which is normally of six or twelve months. 
What makes BITs unique from the point of view of their termination is the systematic 
inclusion of a provision according to which they continue to produce their effects after 
the date of termination in respect of the investment made before such date. Examples of 
this clause can be found in numerous BITs, including BITs concluded between 
developing countries. 
72
 The period is normally 10 or 15 years, and occasionally 5 or 20 
years. 
VI. Interpretation of BITs 
Numerous tribunals have held that investment treaties must be interpreted in accordance 
with the rules of interpretation contained in the VCLT, which reflect customary 
international law 
73
. The applicability of these rules has rarely been challenged by the 
parties to investment disputes. When this occurred, tribunals discarded the argument. In 
RosInvestCo UK Ltd v. Russian Federation, in particular, the Tribunal rejected the 
Claimant‟ argument that these rules are no more than a convenient point of reverence and 
firmly held that the application of these rules is a matter of legal obligation.
74
 
Only exceptionally have tribunals neglected the VCLT. In Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. 
El Salvador, for instance, the Tribunal began the interpretation of the relevant BIT by 
examining the travaux preparatoires and then looked at its terms. Although the travaux 
preparatoires and the literal arguments pointed to the same direction and led to what the 
Tribunal considered as the only correct interpretation, the approach of the Tribunal 
                                               
72 See, for instance, Egypt – India, Article 15 (2); Lebanon – Malaysia, Article 12 (4). See also India 
Model Treaty, Article 15 (2).  
73 See, for instance, Saluka v. Czech Republic, above n. 29, para 296; Mondev International Ltd. v. 
United States, ICSID ARB(AF)/99/2 (NAFTA), Award, 11 October 2002, para. 43; Salini Costruttori 
S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID ARB/02/13, Jurisdiction, 9 November 2004, para 75; Plama 
v. Bulgaria, above n. 40, para 117; Methanex Corp. v. United States, above n. 57, Part II, Chapter B, para 
15; Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID ARB/05/10, Annulment, 16 April 2009, 
para 56. It has also been pointed out that interpretation of investment treaties calls for a “particular duty of 
caution” as one of the parties to the disputes was a stranger to the treaty negotiation, Berman, dissenting 
opinion in Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa Perú, S.A. v. Peru, ICSID ARB/03/4, 
Decision on Annulment, 5 September 2007, para 9. 
74 Para 38. 
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remains questionable.
75
 The logical sequence established in Article 31 VCLT, which has 
its natural point of departure in the literal analysis of the text, must be carefully respected 
by tribunals and departures may lead to misinterpretations of the relevant provisions and 
ultimately distortions of the intention of the contracting parties.   
After some hesitation, investment tribunals have definitely accepted that BITs must be 
interpreted in a balanced and unbiased manner as required by Article 31 VCLT. In this 
regard, in Mondev v. United States, the Tribunal unambiguously rejected that these 
treaties call for an interpretation favourable to the host State or the foreign investor.
76
 
Another Tribunal confirmed that 
a balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignty and the State‟s 
responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of 
economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow. 
77
 
Some doubts have been expressed in literature not about the applicability of the VCLT 
but rather about its adequacy to solve interpretative questions of investment treaties. It 
has been argued that the VCLT “is only of limited use in giving guidance to a tribunal in 
its interpretative task. Problems arise because the VCLT‟s rules of construction are 
capable of supporting a wide range of potential interpretations” 78. 
It is certainly true that Articles 31 to 33 VCLT have not satisfactorily settled all questions 
related to interpretation 
79
 and that they do not ensure an irrefutable interpretation in 
every case. 
80
 This is self-evident when the provision to be interpreted has been drafted – 
intentionally or not – in ambiguous or vague terms.   
                                               
75 Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. El Salvador, ICSID ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 2006, paras 190 to 
203. The Tribunal finally held that the interpretation was confirmed by „a harmonious interpretation‟ based 
on contextual considerations. 
76 Mondev v. United States, above n. 19, para 43 (footnote omitted). 
77 El Paso Energy v. Argentina, Case ARB/03/15, Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para 70. In AMCO v. 
Indonesia, 25 September 1983, 89 ILR (1992) 379, p. 384-5, the Tribunal held that “a convention to 
arbitrate is not to be construed restrictively, nor, as a matter of fact, broadly or liberally. It is to be 
construed in a way which leads to find out and to respect the common will of the parties: such a method is 
but the application of the fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda”. 
78 C. McLachlan, L. Shore, M. Weiniger, above n. 16, p. 67. 
79 For a balanced and thoughtful critical analysis, see M. Fitzmaurice, „Dynamic (Evolutive) 
Interpretation‟, 21 Hague Yearbook of International Law (2008): 101. 
80 R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 9. 
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However, the relevant provisions of the VCLT are a well formulated compromise 
81
 and  
Article 31 in particular contains a single rule combining different elements. 82 An ICSID 
Tribunal has aptly observed that 
[i]nterpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is a process of progressive 
encirclement where the interpreter starts under the general rule with (1) the ordinary meaning 
of the terms of the treaty, (2) in their context and (3) in light of the treaty‟s object and 
purpose, and by cycling through this three step inquiry iteratively closes in upon the proper 
interpretation. 83 
It may be argued that the main shortcoming of Article 31 VCLT lies in the fact that it 
presupposes the harmony of its different elements in the sense that it assumes that is 
possible to find an interpretation based on literal and contextual considerations and 
consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty as well as with other rules of 
international law applicable between the parties. It offers little guidance to the interpreter 
as to how to deal with situations in which the different elements the interpreter must take 
into account are conductive to different interpretations. 
Investment treaties are not immune from this problem as epitomised by the interpretation 
of Article 1 (2) (b) of the BIT between Lithuania and Ukraine, concerning the nationality 
of legal persons, in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine. The majority of the Tribunal stuck to a 
literal interpretation of the provision on the nationality of legal persons and found that the 
only relevant consideration was whether the Claimant was established under the laws of 
Lithuania, regardless to the fact that Ukrainian subjects held 99 % of the company shares. 
84
 In a strongly worded dissenting opinion, the president of the Tribunal argued that the 
object and purpose of the whole ICSID system being the protection of foreign 
                                               
81 T.W. Walde, „Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‟, in C. Binder et al, 
International Investment Law for the 21th Century. Essays in Honous of C. Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009): 724,  at 746 
82 See Yearbook International Law Commission 18 (1966-II), pp. 219-220. The Commission further 
noted that Article 31 „is entitled 'General rule of interpretation' in the singular, not 'General rules' in the 
plural, because the Commission desired to emphasize that the process of interpretation is a unity and that 
the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule‟. 
83 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent's Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para 91. As pointed out by the WTO Appellate Body in EC – Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, 12 September 2005, para 176, 
interpretation is a “holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into rigid components”. See 
also I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Manchester: MUP, 1984), p. 153. 
84
 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID ARB/02/18, Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, para 38. 
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investment, the control over the company is crucial and may prevail over the formal 
criteria indicated in the treaty. 
85
 
With regard to the interaction between BITs and other rules of international law, two 
questions must be briefly addressed. On the one hand, BITs cannot be interpreted “in 
isolation from public international law”.86 Under Article 31 (3) (c) VCLT, the interpreter 
has to take into account “any relevant rule of international law applicable in the relation 
between the parties”. Article 31 (3) (c) has a huge potential in respect to the interpretation 
of BITs as the controversial question that has accompanied systemic interpretation - 
namely whether the relevant rules referred to must be applicable to the parties to the 
dispute or to the parties to the relevant treaty - does not arise in the context of BITs due to 
the bilateral character of these treaties.  
While the relevance of Article 31 (3) (c) is generally accepted in investment arbitration,
87
  
it remains that the expression “to take into account” remains rather vague and could mean 
almost anything. The interpreter is then called to rigorously keep the distinction between 
applicable law and systemic interpretation. From this perspective, a tribunal has aptly 
held that  
Applicable in the relations between the parties‟ must be taken as a reference to rules of 
international law that condition the performance of the specific rights and obligations 
stipulated in the treaty – or else it would amount to a general licence to override the treaty 
terms that would be quite incompatible with the general spirit of the Vienna Convention as a 
whole.
88
 
On the other hand, in a few cases investment tribunals have taken into account, for the 
purpose of interpreting the BIT before them, other BITs concluded by one party – 
normally the Respondent – or both parties with third States.89 Given the res inter alios 
acta character of treaties, reliance on these treaties must be treated with the greatest 
                                               
85 Dissenting opinion P. Weil, especially paras 19 ff. Subsequent tribunals have adopted the view of the 
majority in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, see, C. Schreuer, with L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, A. Sinclair, The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), p. 290-292.  
86
 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, para  78. 
87 See, for instance, Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 
UNCITRAL, 17 March 2006, para 254. 
88
 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, SCC Arb. V079/2005, Jurisdiction, October 2007, para 
39. 
89 See, for instance, Maffezini v. Spain, above n. 18, especially paras 57-61, taking into account only the 
practice of the Respondent; Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, above n. 83, especially paras 289-314, 
comparing the practice of both concerned States.   
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prudence 
90
 and can at best be an “aid to interpretation”,91 certainly not a canon or a rule 
of interpretation.
92
  
In Wintershall v. Argentina, the Tribunal correctly refused to consider treaties concluded 
between the Respondent and third states for the purpose of interpreting the BIT the 
claimant had based its claim upon.
93
 Indeed, the practice related to conclusion of BITs 
with third States does not amount to the subsequent practice of the parties in the 
application of the treaty for the purpose of Article 31 (3) (b) VCLT, nor does it fall into 
any of the elements expressly provided for in Article 31 VCLT. In spite of the silence of 
the VCLT, nevertheless, it may be argued that these treaties could be taken into 
consideration to elucidate a term or a provision contained in the BIT to be interpreted, but 
exclusively to the extent they show a clear and consistent pattern in the practice of both 
parties. Needless to say, such a technique might be impracticable when the concerned 
States have ratified a large number of BITs.  
VII. Settlement of disputes 
Whereas a full treatment of the settlement of disputes related to the interpretation and 
application of BITs falls beyond the purpose of this chapter, a few basic considerations in 
this respect are in order.  Traditionally, foreign investors could rely only on the domestic 
courts of the host State and on diplomatic protection. For different reasons, neither 
remedy offered in the past or offers today an adequate and reliable protection. On the one 
hand, domestic tribunals do not always deliver their decisions effectively and 
                                               
90 In AES Corporation v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/17, Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005, paras 24-25, the 
Tribunal pointed out that „each BIT has its own identity; its very terms should consequently be carefully 
analyzed for determining the exact scope of consent expressed by its two Parties. This is in particular the 
case if one considers that striking similarities in the wording of many BITs often dissimulate real 
differences in the definition of some key concepts, as it may be the case, in particular, for the determination 
of “investments” or for the precise definition of rights and obligations for each party‟. 
91 In L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. v. Algeria, ICSID ARB/05/3, Decision, 12 July 2006, para 84 
(ii), the Tribunal found in another BIT the confirmation a contrario of the interpretation reached on the 
basis of Article 31 VCLT. 
92 See, H. Thirlway, „The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989. Part 
Three‟, BYIL 62 (1991):1 p. 66. In the 2006 Supplement, BYIL 77 (2006) 1, p. 74, however, the same 
author takes a more nuanced position.   
93
 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/04/14, Award, 8 December 2008, para 128. 
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independently; 
94
 on the other hand, diplomatic protection depends on a political initiative 
by the government concerned and is exposed to the risk of politically motivated 
decisions.        
To overcome this unsatisfactory situation, virtually all modern BITs contain provisions 
on the settlement of disputes between the States parties as well as between one of them 
and the investors of the other. The first category of disputes, can be settled either through 
mediation or negotiation, or by resorting to international tribunals. Investment related 
arbitration between States, however, remains quite exceptional. 
95
  
As noted above, investment treaties typically provide also for the settlement of disputes 
between the host State and foreign investors. 
96
 Like State-State disputes, these disputes 
can be settled through negotiations, mediation, consultations or conciliation. 
97
 If a 
friendly settlement cannot be reached, the dispute may be settled before arbitral tribunals 
modelled after international commercial arbitration.
 98
 The importance of access to 
investment arbitral tribunals has been emphasised by numerous tribunals. One of them 
pointed out that     
[t]he creation of ICSID and the adoption of bilateral investment treaties offered to investors 
assurances that disputes that might flow from their investments would not be subject to the 
perceived hazards of delays and political pressures of adjudication in national courts. 
Correspondingly, the prospect of international arbitration was designed to offer to host states 
freedom from political pressures by governments of the state of which the investor is a 
national. 
99
 
                                               
94 On the difficulties surrounding the assessment of the independence of domestic tribunals, see, for 
instance, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F.Supp.2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chevron Corporation v. S. 
Donziger, 2011 WL 778052 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
95 For one of the rare examples of investment disputes between States, see Italian Republic v. Republic 
of Cuba, ad hoc arbitration, Final Award, 15 July 2008. 
96 For two examples of BITs silent on the settlement of disputes between foreign investor and a party to 
the treaty, see the BITs between Switzerland and Morocco, and between Bulgaria and Cyprus. 
97 For a BIT providing for conciliation, see Article 9 (2) of the BIT between India and the United 
Kingdom. 
98 On the importance of negotiations and mediation, see, in particular, T. Wälde, „Effective 
Management of Transnational Disputes: Mutual Gain by Mediation or Joint Loss in Litigation‟, Arbitration 
International 22 (2006): 205.   
99 Gas Natural SDG v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/10, Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005, paras 29 ff (notes 
omitted). 
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Provisions on the settlement of investor-State disputes may vary significantly with regard 
to their scope of application, the choice of the arbitral tribunal, the applicable law and any 
other procedural matters. They normally contain a standing offer that is unconditionally 
made by the host State and expresses the State‟s consent to settle before investment 
tribunals any dispute or certain categories of disputes that may arise with foreign 
investors of the other party. The consent of the host State matches that of the foreign 
investor the moment the latter files a request for arbitration or accepts in writing the 
competence of the arbitral tribunal. 
100
 Some BITs identify the arbitral tribunal competent 
to settle the dispute between foreign investors and the host State,
101
 while others leave 
foreign investors and possibly the host State the choice between two or more investment 
arbitral proceedings.
102
 
The requirement to exhaust them before resorting to international arbitration, which was 
rather rare in old BITs, has almost completely disappeared in modern BITs,
103
 a 
development in line with Article 26 ICSID and the jurisprudence of investment tribunals 
outside ICSID. 
104
 Although abandoned as procedural requirement, the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies may nonetheless still apply as substantive standard with regard to 
                                               
100 J. Paulsson, „Arbitration without Privity‟, ICSID Review/FILJ 10 (1995): 232; C. Schreuer, „Consent 
to Arbitration‟, in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p. 830 
101 See, for instance, Article 8 BIT between the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. 
102 See, for instance, Article VI (2) BIT between the United States and Estonia; Article 9 (3) BIT 
between United Kingdom and India; Article 8 (5) BIT between Italy and Argentina; Article 8 (3) BIT 
between Pakistan and Egypt. 
103 C. Schreuer, „Travelling the BIT Route – Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the 
Road‟, Journal of World Investment & Trade 5 (2004): 231; Id., „Calvo‟s Grandchildren: The Return of 
Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration‟, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1 
(2005): 1. 
104 See, for instance, within NAFTA, Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, 
ICSID ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFTA), Merits, 26 June 2003, para 1424 ff.; and within ASEAN, Yaung Chi Oo 
Trading PTE Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar ASEAN ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1, Final 
Award, 31 March 2003, para 40. 
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certain categories of claims based on BITs, namely indirect expropriation 
105
 and denial 
of justice,
106
 due to the intrinsic nature of the alleged breaches.   
Three types of clauses often deal with the co-ordination between proceedings before 
domestic courts and arbitral tribunals. Several BITs contain a co-called fork in the road 
provision, according to which the applicant must make a final choice between bringing 
the case before national courts or before investment tribunals. The wording of these 
provisions may vary and normally is sufficiently clear. 
107
 Their functioning is limited to 
cases in which the applicant is seeking to institute proceedings before a domestic court 
and an investment tribunal in relation to the same dispute involving the same parties and 
the same cause of action. 
108
 
A second type of clause contains a waiver, as does Article 26 (2) of the United States 
Model Treaty.
109
 Unlike fork in the road clauses, these clauses require foreign investor to 
waive, at the time they bring a dispute before an investment arbitral tribunal, all other 
claims related to the same conduct or measures adopted by the host State. These clauses 
not only prevent parallel proceedings, but also offer to foreign investors the possibility to 
have their claims adjudicated first by national tribunals and then, if necessary, by 
investment arbitral tribunals, and to the host State the opportunity to judicially redress the 
wrongdoing, if any.
110
   
                                               
105 In Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID ARB/00/9, Final Award, 16 September 2003, para 
20.30, the Tribunal referred to “a reasonable – not necessarily exhaustive – effort by the investor to obtain 
correction” before domestic courts. 
106 Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 34877, Interim Award, 1 December 2008, para 235. 
107 Compare, for instance, Article VI (2) BIT between the United States and Ecuador; Article 8 (2) BIT 
between France and Argentina; Article VIII (2) BIT between Indonesia and Zimbabwe; Article 13 (1) BIT 
between Argentina and Australia; Article VI (2) BIT between the United State and Estonia. 
108 C. Schreuer, with L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, A. Sinclair, above note 85, p. 365 ff. 
109 For another example, see Article 9 (2) BIT between Greece and Mexico, under which “[i]f an 
investor submits a claim to arbitration […], neither he or his investment that is a legal person may initiate 
or continue proceedings before a national tribunal, except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or 
other extraordinary relief, nor involving the payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or court 
under the law of the disputing Contracting Party”. See also Article 12 (3) of the BIT between Iran and 
South Africa, according to which “National courts shall not have jurisdiction over any dispute referred to 
arbitration”.   
110 See on this point C. McLachlan, L. Shore, M. Weiniger, above n. 16, p. 107-109. See also Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB(AF)/98/2 (NAFTA), Jurisdiction, 2 June 2000.  
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A third type of clause imposes upon the applicant a waiting period during which litigation 
must be pursued before domestic courts before resorting to investment tribunals.
111
 The 
period may be as long as 18 months 
112
 and has been described by a tribunal as 
“nonsensical for a practical point of view”. 113 While the number of BITs containing such 
a clause remains limited, foreign investors are often able to dodge it by invoking MFN 
treatment.   
VIII. BITs and contracts 
BITs and contracts are different legal instruments concluded between different parties 
and possessing different legal nature. The rights and obligations they contain are entirely 
independent, are governed by the respective applicable laws, and subject to their 
respective jurisdictional clauses.  
Yet, a conduct or measure may amount to a violation of either or both the BIT and the 
contract. The claim(s) that may arise must be settled in accordance with the relevant 
jurisdictional clause(s).
114
 As pointed out by the ad hoc Committee in Vivendi I, 
[w]hether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of the 
contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its 
own proper or applicable law – in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the 
Concession Contract, by the proper law of the contract […]. 
115
 
As long as a tribunal has been seized on the basis of the BIT, its competence is confined 
to determine whether a breach of the BIT has occurred and, if appropriate, to indicate the 
                                               
111 See C. Schreuer, above n. 85. 
112 See, for instance Article 10 (2) BIT between Germany and Argentina ; Article 8 (3) BIT between 
Italy and Argentina. Under Article VII (2) BIT between Turkey and Pakistan, a dispute may be submitted 
before an arbitral tribunal if the investor concerned has brought it before the domestic courts of the host 
State and a final award has not be rendered within one year”.  
113 Plama v. Bulgaria, above n. 40, para 224. 
114 Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/97/3, 
Annulment, 3 July 2002, para 95 (Vivendi I). In SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, 
ICSID ARB/01/13, Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para 147, the Tribunal held that “the same set of facts can 
give rise to different claims grounded on different legal orders: the municipal and the international legal 
orders”, para 147. See also Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID ARB/03/3, Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005, para 
258; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Pakistan, ICSID ARB/03/29, Jurisdiction, 14 
November 2005, para 160; Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, 
ICSID ARB/97/3, Award, 20 August 2007, 7.3.10 (Vivendi II). 
115
 Vivendi I, para 96, Vivendi II, para 7.3.10. 
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consequences of such a breach. For the purpose of the proceedings before the tribunal, it 
is irrelevant whether the act allegedly contrary to the BIT also amounts to a breach of a 
contract. 
116
   
Nonetheless, a tribunal is entitled, if not even obliged, to interpret the contract to the 
extent this is indispensable to establish whether any violation of the BIT has been 
committed. This was clearly held in Vivendi I and Vivendi II. In the latter case, the 
Tribunal held that it was allowed  
to consider such alleged contractual breaches not for the purpose of determining whether a 
party has incurred liability under domestic law, but to the extent necessary to analyze and 
determine whether there has been a breach of the Treaty.
117
  
Besides, States may commit themselves by treaty to comply with contractual obligations. 
Failure to comply with this commitment would amount to a breach of the treaty. 
Although “responsibility for breach of treaty is conceptually distinct from responsibility 
for breach of contract […] the latter may, depending on the context, entail or imply the 
former”.118  
If the treaty, interpreted in accordance with the rules on interpretation contained in the 
VCLT so provide, therefore, a treaty-based investment tribunal may exercise it 
jurisdiction in respect of contractual claims. This may occur, in the first place, on the 
basis of sufficiently wild jurisdictional clauses which confer the tribunal competence, for 
instance, for “disputes regarding investments”,
119
 “dispute with respect to investments”, 
120
 or “any dispute arising” 
121
 between a Contracting Party and the investor of the other 
Contracting Party.  
On this point, it has been observed that 
                                               
116 Eureko B.V. v. Poland, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 19 August 2005, para 112. 
117 Para 7.3.10.  
118 J. Crawford, „Treaty and Contract Investment Arbitration‟, Treaty and Contract in Investment 
Arbitration‟, Arbitration International 24 (2008): 341, p. 357-358.  
119 Article 7 BIT between Italy and Lebanon. Article 8 BIT between France and Argentina reads in the 
relevant part “tout différend relatif aux investissements”. 
120 Article 9 (1) BIT between China and Switzerland. 
121
 Article 9 (1) BIT between Italy and Pakistan. 
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when a BIT provides for investor/State arbitration in respect of all investment disputes rather 
than dispute concerning violations of the BIT, the tribunal is competent even for pure 
contract claims 
122
.  
Not all contractual obligations can be brought before a treaty based investment tribunal. It 
must be stressed that the obligation must be related to the investment. An ordinary 
contract, such as a contract for the supply of goods, does not fall within the competence 
of the tribunal. 
123
 
Additionally, the contract must in principle be attributable to the State itself and not to 
State entities possessing independent legal personality, unless the treaty provides 
otherwise. It may further be argued that nothing prevent contracting parties from 
committing themselves to respect, as a matter of treaty law, contracts concluded between 
these entities. 
Claims based on contracts can also reach a treaty-based investment tribunal through so-
called umbrella clauses. These clauses are inserted in several BITs and typically 
guarantee that each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it owns to foreign  
investments.
124
 Since both the wording and the scope of application of these clauses may 
vary, a carefully interpretation of umbrella clauses on an individual basis is required. 
After decades of oblivion, these clauses made a boisterous appearance in ICSID 
arbitration at the end of 2003. The decisions that followed have not always been 
consistent and jurisprudence remains unsettled. The interpretation and application of 
these clauses, as well as the construction of the underlying rights will be discussed in 
                                               
122 C. Schreuer, „Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims – the Vivendi I 
Case Considered‟, in T. Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from 
the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (London: Cameron, 2005) p. 281. 
In ICSID jurisprudence, see, for instance, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID 
ARB/02/6, Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para 131. See also S. Alexandrov, „Breach of Treaty Claims and 
Breach of Contract Claims: Is it Still Unknown Territory?‟, in K. Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under 
International Investment Agreements: a Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford: OUP, 2010) p. 323. 
123 See, for instance, CMS Gas Transmission Company and Argentina, ICSID Case ARB/01/8, Award, 
12 May 2005, para 299. See also J. Crawford, above n. 118, p. 362. 
124 In literature see C. Schreuer, „Travelling the BIT Route. Of Waiting Period, Umbrella Clauses and 
Forks in the Road‟, JWI&T 5 (2004) 231; S.A. Alexandrov, „Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty. 
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detail in Chapter VII of this book. For the purpose of the present chapter, suffice it to 
note that despite several divergences both in jurisprudence and literature, there is ample 
agreement that  umbrella clauses may cover contractual obligations – the extent of which 
remains undefined – that could be susceptible of adjudication before treaty-based 
international investment tribunals. This has been accepted by all tribunals, even those that 
have adopted a narrow interpretation of these clauses.
125
 It remains to explain how this 
occurs. Two theoretical explanations have been put forward. 
According to the first view, these clauses oblige the host State to comply with its 
contractual obligations lest committing a breach of the treaty which would unavoidably 
entail its international responsibility and trigger its jurisdictional remedies. Nonetheless, 
the nature of contractual obligations does not change and remain distinct from the 
obligations stemming from the treaty. As pointed out by the ad hoc Committee in CMS v. 
Argentina,  
[t]he effect of the umbrella clause is not to transform the obligation which is relied on into 
something else; the content of the obligation is unaffected, as is its proper law. If this is so, it 
would appear that the parties to the obligation (i.e., the persons bound by it and entitled to 
rely on it) are likewise not changed by reason of the umbrella clause. 
126
 
According to the second view, on the contrary, umbrella clauses transform breaches of 
the contract into violations of the treaty. In L.E.S.I. v. Algeria, the tribunal held that 
                                               
125 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003,  Joy 
Mining Machinery Ltd v Egypt, ICSID ARB/03/11, Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004. The second tribunal seems 
to limit such a possibility to contract of a certain – yet undefined – magnitude (para 51). 
126 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/8, Annulment Decision, 25 
September 2007, para 95 (c). According to P. Mayer, „La neutralisation du pouvoir normative de l‟Etat en 
matière de contrats d‟Etat‟, Journal de droit international 113 (1986) 5, p. 36-7, umbrella clauses 
“empêchent l‟Etat de méconnaître ses engagements contractuels sous peine de violer le traité. Mais certains 
auteurs leur attachent une conséquence encore plus radicale: ils transformeraient les obligations 
contractuelles en obligations internationales. Cette position méconnaît qu‟il existe deux rapports distincts et 
parallèles: le rapport inter partes, entre parties au contrat d‟Etat, qui reste soumise à la lex contractus, et le 
rapport interétatique, qui relève du droit de gens. Que la violation par l‟Etat de ses obligations nées du 
contrat constitue en même temps la violation du traité ne suffit pas à altérer la nature de l‟un ou de l‟autre”.  
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[c]es clauses ont pour effet de transformer les violations des engagements contractuels de 
l'Etat en violations de cette disposition du traité et, par là même, de donner compétence au 
tribunal arbitral mis en place en application du traité pour en connaître. 127 
The debate is however largely academic and of limited practical relevance if it is 
accepted that under these clauses a treaty-based tribunal is entitled to adjudicate 
contractual claims. The crux of the matter remains to establish when a contractual 
obligation falls within the scope an umbrella clause. Again, given the textual differences 
of umbrella clauses, this must be determined on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 
the VCLT rules on interpretation.  
 
IX. Concluding remarks 
Bilateral investment treaties have played and continue to play a crucial role in the 
promotion of the rule of law and the development of a stable and predictable legal 
framework. They are not only there to stay, at least in the near future: they are also quite 
successful. Their success is due to several factors, including the following. 
First, the great flexibility of a bilateral framework allows contracting parties to tailor and 
adapt treaty provisions in order to meet their own specific and evolving needs. From this 
perspective, while BITs remain manifestly unbalanced in favour of foreign investors, 
recent practice shows that some States are prepared to include in BITs provisions on the 
protection of the environment, thus addressing one of the main sources of criticism of 
BITs, alongside with the scarce attention paid to human rights and labour standards.   
Second, from the standpoint of foreign investors, BITs contain attractive substantive 
provisions whose effects are amplified by the MFN and NT clauses. BITs have generated 
a largely coherent body of jurisprudence and had a significant impact on the evolution of 
customary international law. Yet, inconsistent decisions on BIT claims have been 
delivered in the past and several issues still remain fraught with uncertainty. The risk of 
inconsistent decisions, however, is not peculiar to a bilateral framework, but rather 
inherent in the sovereign character of arbitral tribunals. 
                                               
127 Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. v. Algeria, ICSID Case ARB/03/08, 10 January 2005, para 25 (ii). 
Here the Tribunal is paraphrasing P. Weil, „Problèmes relatifs aux contrats passés entre un état et un 
particulier‟, Recueil des cours 128 (1969) p. 130. See also E. Gaillard, Journal de droit international 
(2005) 211. 
In T. Gazzini, E. De Brabandere  (eds.), International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations  
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012 (forthcoming) 
 
 
 34 
Third, BITs provide for truly innovative provisions on the settlement of disputes. These 
provisions elevate foreign investors to full participants in international law through direct 
access to international investment tribunals. Such an access ensures to foreign investors 
an unprecedented level of legal protection and overcome the risks and hazards which are 
often associate to domestic remedies and diplomatic protection.    
Fourth, by concluding BITs States certainly do not relinquish their regulatory powers: 
they merely accept to respect some further limits to their exercise in dealings with foreign 
investors of the other party. It will inevitably be for adjudicators to determine, in the light 
of the facts at issue, whether these limits have been breached. 
128
 Adjudicating often 
requires to strike a delicate balance between the right to the host State to regulate and the 
protection of foreign investors rights and legitimate expectations.   
Considering that the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on investment still appears rather 
remote and without prejudice to the increasing importance of investment-related 
provisions in regional economic integration agreements, the real challenge today is how 
to increase the coherence and effectiveness of the current, largely bilateral legal 
framework. From this perspective, the potential of BITs is enormous and not fully 
exploited yet. 
 
                                               
128 See, with regard to indirect expropriation, L.Y. Fortier, „Caveat Investor: The Meaning of 
Expropriation and the Protection Afforded Investors Under NAFTA‟, News from ICSID 20 (2003) p. 11. 
